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Within the European Union, framework decisions have been developing at 
a steady pace since the year 2000. Obligations ensue from these framework 
decisions for the Member States to adjust their own national laws and regula-
tions, if necessary, in the manner prescribed by the framework decisions. The 
obligation to make the necessary adjustments to national regulations is en-
shrined in Article 34(2)(b) of the TEU. It stipulates that framework decisions 
are binding on the Member States as to the result to be achieved, but leaves 
it up to the Member States to choose the form and methods to achieve that 
result. The TEU does not give any other rules on implementing framework 
decisions.
When it comes to implementation, framework decisions show similarities 
to directives. According to Article 249(3) EC, directives are also binding as 
to the result to be achieved, and the choice of the form and methods of imple-
mentation is left to the Member States. In case law of the European Court of 
Justice, relatively detailed rules have been developed on implementing direc-
tives. That case law defines the freedom of choice that Article 249(3) EC 
allows the Member States in more detail. This paper centres on the question 
whether norms (or principles) – similar or otherwise to the rules developed 
for directives – can also be designated which the Member States must ob-
serve in implementing framework decisions. 
The search for the existence and content of norms for the implementation 
of framework decisions follows two lines. First of all, the meaning of Article 
34(2)(b) TEU can be worked out in more detail on the basis of a comparison 
with the Treaty definition of the directive as legal instrument. In section 2, a 
schematic overview is given of the case law of the Court of Justice on imple-
menting directives, after which in section 3, the Treaty definitions of frame-
work decisions and directives are compared and analysed. The second line 
of research concerns the evaluation practice that has developed in relation to 
framework decisions, in which the Commission and Council take positions 
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on the way in which Member States transpose framework decisions. This 
practice is mapped out in section 4 on the basis of examples, in order to bring 
to light the rules (implicitly) applied. Finally, in section 5, the findings on the 
European norms for implementing framework decisions are summarized. The 
main framework decisions and reports by the Commission on measures taken 
to comply with them are listed in an Annexe.
2. Rules for implementing directives
The freedom allowed the Member States on the basis of Article 249(3) EC 
in the choice of form and methods for the transposition of directives is con-
nected with respect (to a certain extent) for the sovereignty and position of 
the national legislatures; at the same time, it makes it possible for Member 
States to take account of specific national matters – legal or otherwise – in 
implementing the directives. Viewed in this light, one could say that it does 
not matter how Member States achieve the intended result, as long as they 
achieve it. The Court of Justice has nevertheless developed fairly detailed 
rules on the way in which directives have to be implemented.1 According to 
established case law: 
“… the existence of general principles of constitutional or administra-
tive law may render implementation by specific legislation superfluous, 
provided however that those principles guarantee that the national authori-
ties will in fact apply the directive fully and that, where the directive is 
intended to create rights for individuals, the legal position arising from 
those principles is sufficiently precise and clear and the persons concerned 
are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, afforded the 
possibility of relying on them before the national courts.”2
In the case of obligations regarding individuals stemming from a directive, 
the legal position under national law must also be sufficiently precise and 
clear for individuals concerned to know their obligations.3
Two main rules can be deduced from the case law of the Court of Justice: 
a) directives must be transposed into national law in a timely manner, and b) 
the form and methods chosen to do so must be effective, in other words: the 
1. See Prechal, Directives in EC Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 74–91.
2. Case C-29/84, Commission v. Germany, [1985] ECR 1661, para 23. See also Case C-
365/93, Commission v. Greece, [1995] ECR I-499, para 9; Case C-144/99, Commission v. 
Netherlands, [2001], ECR I-3541, para 17; Case C-455/00, Commission v. Italy, [2002] ECR 
I-9231, para 23; Case C-70/03, Commission v. Spain [2004] ECR I-7999, para 15. 
3. See e.g. Case C-366/89, Commission v. Italy, [1993] ECR I-4201, para 17.
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result intended by the directive must be achieved. The Court of Justice does 
not allow the Member States complete freedom in choosing the form and 
methods. Member States are expected to transpose the provisions of the di-
rective into binding national provisions. Consequently, achieving the intended 
result but without drafting binding provisions is not sufficient. The full ap-
plication of directives must be guaranteed “in law and not only in fact” and 
Member States must therefore establish a specific legal framework.4 Imple-
mentation of a directive on the basis of administrative practices, circulars 
and policy rules is rejected by the Court of Justice.5 The underlying idea is 
not only that it is easy for administrative practices, circulars and policy rules 
to change, but also that a sufficiently specific and clear legal position of the 
individuals concerned requires the drafting of rules that can be known and 
enforced.6 This leaves little margin for the type of rules into which provisions 
of directives are transposed. For the sake of completeness, it should be men-
tioned that transposition of provisions of directives into binding national rules 
does not in itself suffice as full application of those directives: such applica-
tion must be guaranteed in law and in fact. The binding national rules must 
be enforced in actual practice.7
Besides the binding force of the rules, an additional requirement is that 
these rules are to be formulated specifically, precisely and clearly.8 This guar-
antees that the rights and obligations ensuing from a directive can be known 
and enforced. In this context, the question arises as to what margin is left in 
transposing terms from directives into national law. Is there a strong prefer-
ence for literally taking over the terms of the directives or can they be trans-
lated into customary terms and concepts of national law? A relevant ruling of 
the Court of Justice in this regard states that:
4. Case C-339/87, Commission v. Netherlands, [1990] ECR I-851, para 25. See also Case 
C-340/96, Commission v. United Kingdom, [1999] ECR I-2023, para 27; Case C-429/01, 
Commission v. France, [2003] ECR I-14355, para 40; Case C-410/03, Commission v. Italy, 
[2005], ECR I-3507, para 32.
5. Cf. Case C-131/88, Commission v. Germany, [1991] ECR 825, para 8; Case C-394/00, 
Commission v. Ireland, [2002] ECR I-581, para 11; Case C-259/01, Commission v. France, 
[2002] ECR 11093, para 19; Case C-146/04, Commission v. Netherlands, judgement of 14 April 
2005, nyr, para 6.
6. Cf. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 83–84.
7. Cf. Case 14/83, Von Colson & Kamann, [1984] ECR 1891, para 18, 23, 28; Case C-
68/88, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 2965, para 24; Case C-382/92, Commission v. United 
Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435, para 55; Case C-40/04, Yonemoto, [2005] ECR I-7755, para 59. 
See also Prechal, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 54: “There has been a discernible shift in attention 
towards situations concerning the non-application of the directive which has, as such, been 
correctly transposed.”
8. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 75.
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“… the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessar-
ily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in 
express, specific legislation; a general legal context may, depending on 
the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose provided that it 
does indeed guarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently 
clear and precise manner …”9
Satisfaction with a “general legal context” allows the Member States a cer-
tain margin, but, on closer analysis, this margin is not very wide. Member 
States must, as stated above, choose binding provisions which are not only 
sufficiently knowable and enforceable, but are also formulated specifically, 
precisely and clearly. The wording of those provisions may not have to be 
the verbatim terminology used in the directive, but the content may not be 
different. It also depends on the nature of the subject-matter regulated in a 
directive and the discretion left to the Member States in this regard whether 
and to what extent different terminology can achieve the same substantive re-
sult.10 It is, for that matter, conceivable that the implementation of a directive 
in a Member State will not require new legislation, because the existing leg-
islation already guarantees the result intended by the directive to a sufficient 
extent.11
This brief discussion makes it clear that the Court of Justice sets fairly 
stringent requirements for the binding force of transposition provisions. The 
Member States are allowed somewhat more freedom in formulating those 
provisions. The determining factor is then whether the actual norm is for-
mulated so specifically, precisely and clearly that the result intended by the 
directive is adequately guaranteed. Although this does exert a certain amount 
of pressure to take over the text of a directive fairly literally, this is not always 
necessary.
3. Article 34(2)(b) TEU
3.1. An initial comparison with Article 249(3) EC
The text of Article 34(2)(b) TEU is closely in line with the description of 
the First Pillar legal instrument of the directive in Article 249(3) EC. In both 
provisions, the binding force in relation to the result to be achieved and the 
9. Case C-363/85, Commission v. Italy, [1987] ECR 1733, para 7.
10. Cf. Case C-363/85, Commission v. Italy, [1987] ECR 1733; Case C-247/85, Commission 
v. Belgium, [1987] ECR 3029; Case C-233/00, Commission v. France, [2003] ECR I-6625.
11. See for example Case C-363/85, Commission v. Italy, [1987] ECR 1733.
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right to choose the form and methods is stated. At the same time, it must be 
concluded that Article 34(2)(b) TEU has an addition lacking in Article 249(3) 
EC: “They [framework decisions; MJB] shall not entail direct effect.” The 
precise meaning of this addition, certainly after the judgment of the Court 
of Justice in the Pupino case,12 is rather controversial. It is helpful to explore 
the similarity of Article 34(2)(b) to Article 249(3) EC and the differences be-
tween those provisions, in order to consider on that basis the extent to which 
the implementation rules developed by the Court of Justice for directives 
could be applied to framework decisions as well.
3.2. Similarity to Article 249(3) EC
The similarity between Article 34(2)(b) TEU and Article 249(3) EC has al-
ready been mentioned. It should be added that, in one respect, the text of 
Article 34(2)(b) TEU is (or appears to be) formulated more sharply than 
that of Article 249(3) EC. Framework decisions, according to the text of the 
TEU, are also for the purpose of approximating the laws and regulations of 
the Member States. It seems to follow from this that the result intended by a 
framework decision should be achieved by laying down rights and obligations 
in the form of written rules. This implies a codification requirement, regard-
ing which Article 34(2)(b) TEU still allows the Member States the freedom to 
determine content by accepting “regulations” in addition to “laws” – in other 
language versions, “dispositions législatives et réglementaires” and “Rechts- 
und Verwaltungsvorschriften” are mentioned – as appropriate transposition 
instruments. 
A reference to (the approximation of) laws and regulations is missing in 
Article 249 EC, but this is referred to explicitly in other EC rules in relation 
to the drafting of directives.13 Moreover, as was evident from section 2 above, 
the requirement follows from the case law of the Court of Justice that provi-
sions of the directive must be transposed into binding national rules. In view 
of this case law, and based on the text of Article 34(2)(b) TEU, directives and 
framework decisions have important similarities as legal instruments.14 In a 
more general sense, this connection between Article 34(2)(b) TEU and Ar-
ticle 249(3) EC is expressed in the Pupino judgment of the Court of Justice. 
The point of departure of the Court’s reasoning, which leads to the assump-
tion of an obligation for the national court to interpret as far as possible in 
12. Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285.
13. Art. 46(2), 47(2), 94 and 95(2) EC. 
14. Cf. Ligeti, Strafrecht und strafrechtliche Zusammenarbeit in der Europäischen Union 
(Duncker & Humblot, 2005), p. 263.
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the light of the wording and purpose of framework decisions, starts with the 
conclusion that the formulation of Article 34(2)(b) TEU is very closely in 
line with that of Article 249(3) EC.15
3.3. Differences with Article 249(3) EC
In Article 34(2)(b) TEU, the direct effect of framework decisions is explicitly 
excluded.  The relevant phrase seems primarily intended to exclude the case 
law of the Court of Justice on the direct effect of directives – in other words: 
the direct effect of rules of a directive in the national legal order in case that 
directive is transposed incorrectly, late or not at all.16 The exclusion of direct 
effect is often considered in the literature as an emphasis on the essentially 
intergovernmental nature of cooperation in the Third Pillar. In consequence, 
the Third Pillar has its own legal order which is less far-reaching and radical 
than the Community legal order of the First Pillar. It may well be acknowl-
edged that the Third Pillar has a few, mostly weakened, Community char-
acteristics,17 but there is no question of a Community legal order as such.18 
15. Pupino, supra note 12, para 33.
16. Monjal, “Le droit dérivé de l’Union européenne en quête d’identité”, (2001) RTDE, 
357–358; Baddenhausen and Pietsch, “Rahmenbeschlüsse der Europäischen Union – Nach 
den Entscheidungen zum Europäischen Haftbefehlsgesetz (BVerfG) und in der Rechtssache 
Pupino (EuGH)”, (2005) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 1565; Hillgruber, “Unionsrecht und 
nationales recht – der Fall Pupino”, (2005) JZ, 842; Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, Constitutional 
Law of the European Union, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), pp. 806–807; Tinkl, “Anmerkung zum 
Urteil des EuGH vom 16.6.2005 – C-105/03 (Pupino)”, (2006) Strafverteidiger, 37. See also 
Bundesverfassungsgericht 18 July 2005, nr. 2 BvR 2236/04, (2005) NJW, 2289–2303, para 80.
17. Cf. Fetzer and Groß, “Die Pupino-Entscheidung des EuGH – Abkehr vom 
intergouvernementalen Charakter der EU?”, (2005) EuZW, 550; Hecker, Europäisches 
Strafrecht, (Springer, 2005), pp. 158–159; Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Pupino, supra note 12, 
para 31.
18. Denza, The intergovernmental pillars of the European Union, (Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 1–4, 18–20, 287; Jour-Schröder and Wasmeier, in: Von der Groeben & Schwarze, 
Kommentar zum Vertrag über de Europäische Union und zur Gründung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, Band I, (Nomos, 2003), pp. 273–274; Satzger, in: Streinz (ed.), EUV/EGV, 
(C.H. Beck, 2003), p. 140; Geiger, EUV/EGV, (C.H. Beck, 2004), p. 105; Adam, “Die 
Wirkung von EU-Rahmenbeschlüssen im mitgliedstaatlichen Recht”, (2005) EuZW, 558–
560; Oppermann, Europarecht, (C.H. Beck, 2005), pp. 139, 186–187; Fetzer and Groß, op. 
cit. supra note 17, at 550; Herrmann, “Gemeinschaftsrechtskonforme Auslegung nationalen 
Rechts in Strafverfahren”, (2005) EuZW, 437; Hillgruber, op. cit. supra note 16, at 841; Ligeti, 
op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 59, 63, 261–262; Gärditz and Gusy, “Zur Wirkung europäischer 
Rahmenbeschlüsse im innerstaatlichen Recht. Zugleich Besprechung von EuGH, Urteil vom 
16.6.2005”, (2006) Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht, 225–226; Haratsch/Koenig/Pechstein, 
Europarecht, (Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp. 511–512; Tinkl, op. cit. supra note 16, at 37; Von 
Unger, “Pupino: Der EuGH vergemeinschaftet das intergouvernementale Recht”, (2006) Neue 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 47. On the intention of the authors of the Treaty on European 
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Within the legal order of the Third Pillar, the sovereignty of the Member 
States in the area of criminal law is expressly first and foremost. It is also 
evident from this that within the Third Pillar, unanimity is always required 
for the adoption of framework decisions, and not qualified majority. Admit-
tedly, unanimous decision making occurs in the First Pillar as well. However, 
the procedure of Article 251 EC, where a qualified majority suffices, is the 
most important procedure for the adoption of directives.
The exclusion of direct effect in Article 34(2)(b) TEU has not prevented 
the Court of Justice from accepting in the Pupino judgment the obligation of 
consistent interpretation for framework decisions. In this way, the Court of 
Justice extends the obligation developed in Community law for the (judicial) 
bodies of Member States to interpret in accordance with directives to the le-
gal instrument of the framework decision. This is a remarkable decision for at 
least one reason. In Community law, the obligation to interpret in accordance 
with directives is closely connected with the direct effect of directives. Inter-
pretation in accordance with directives is considered as an indirect form of 
the effect of Community law, while direct effect is its direct form. The con-
nection between interpretation in accordance with directives and direct effect 
is evident from the Community principles, namely: the obligation under Arti-
cle 249 EC to produce a result, the principle of Community loyalty in Article 
10 EC, and the guarantee of useful effect, which together can be traced back 
to (safeguarding) the Community legal order.19 The direct effect of frame-
work decisions is ruled out, thus the question arises whether the consequence 
of this must be that the indirect effect of framework decisions – in the form 
of the obligation to interpret in the light of framework decisions – must also 
be covered by the exclusion of direct effect in Article 34(2)(b) TEU.20 In 
other words, what is the legal basis in EU law for the obligation to interpret 
in conformity with framework decisions? It is true that some national legal 
orders recognize an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with 
international public law, but the key question is whether EU law itself – and 
Union in relation to the legal order of the Third Pillar, see also extensively Peers, “Salvation 
Outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and Segi Judgments”, 
44 CML Rev. (2007) 919–921.
19. See Fletcher, “Extending ‘indirect effect’ to the third pillar: the significance of Pupino?”, 
(2005) EL Rev.,  862; Prechal, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 180, 219.
20. Confirming: Fetzer and Groß, op. cit. supra note 17, at 550–551; Fletcher, op. cit. supra 
note 19, at 872; Hillgruber, op. cit. supra note 16, at 842; Tinkl, op. cit. supra note 16, at 39; Von 
Unger, op. cit. supra note 18, at 48. Denying: Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, op. cit. supra note 16, 
p. 712; Adam, op. cit. supra note 18, at 561; Herrmann, op. cit. supra note 18, at 437; Killmann, 
“Die rahmenbeschlusskonforme Auslegung im Strafrecht vor dem EuGH”, (2005) Juristische 
Blätter, 569; Lenaerts and Corthaut, “Of birds and hedges: the role of primacy in invoking 
norms of EU law”, (2006) EL Rev., 288–290. 
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more particularly Article 34(2)(b) TEU – provides a (sufficient) legal basis 
for such an obligation. It is clear that the Court of Justice is of the view that 
the exclusion of direct effect in Article 34(2)(b) TEU does not pose an obsta-
cle to requiring the indirect effect of framework decisions. It is nevertheless 
remarkable that the Court of Justice does not devote any attention at all to the 
exclusion of direct effect in Article 34(2)(b) TEU. This raises the following 
question, namely the extent to which the Court of Justice has brought about 
the “communitarization” of the Third Pillar in the Pupino judgment. 
Interpreting the implications of the Pupino judgment is no simple matter. 
Interpretations are possible in which the obligation to interpret in accordance 
with framework decisions is separated from the explicit exclusion of the di-
rect effect of framework decisions.21 But it is also possible – we suffice here 
with the mere observation – to put forth all kinds of plausible arguments 
against the Court of Justice’s ruling and especially the grounds for that rul-
ing, of which we have already noted the nature of the legal order of the Third 
Pillar and the apparent intention of the drafters of the TEU regarding the ex-
clusion of direct effect in Article 34(2)(b) TEU. A point on which proponents 
and opponents of acceptance of the obligation of consistent interpretation 
with framework decisions agree is, at any rate, that in the Pupino judgment, 
the Court of Justice emphasized – or wanted to emphasize – precisely the 
connection between directives and framework decisions as legal instruments, 
and in doing so paralleled the integration of the First and Third Pillar accord-
ing to the Community model in the Constitution for Europe.22 For the rest, it 
is nonetheless true that there is no evidence in the Pupino judgment that the 
Court of Justice now considers the “ordinary” direct effect of framework de-
cisions possible, in the sense that framework decisions could directly – out-
side the frameworks of national legislation – entail rights and obligations for 
citizens. This difference between framework decisions and directives has not 
(yet) disappeared.
21. Adam, op. cit. supra note 18, at 561; Egger, “Die Bindung der Mitgliedstaaten an die 
Grundrechte in der III. Säule”, (2005) EuZW, 653–654; Haratsch, Koenig and Pechstein, op. 
cit. supra note 18, p. 511; Fetzer and Groß, op. cit. supra note 17, at 551; Herrmann, op. cit. 
supra note 18, at 437; Lenaerts and Corthaut, op. cit. supra note 20, at 293; Fletcher, op. cit. 
supra note 19, at 873, 875–876; Killmann, op. cit. supra note 20, at 571; Peers, op. cit supra 
note 18, at 913–924. On the issue of supremacy of Third Pillar law without direct effect, cf. also 
Dougan, “When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of the Relationship between Direct Effect 
and Supremacy”, 44 CML Rev., (2007) 931–963.
22. Chalmers, “The Court of Justice and the Third Pillar”, (2005) EL Rev., 773–774. See also 
Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 19, at 869–870, 877; Hillgruber, op. cit. supra note 16, at 844; Tinkl, 
op. cit. supra note 16, at 40; Von Unger, op. cit. supra note 18, at 48. Since the EU summit of 
21 June 2007, it would seem that the Constitution as such is abandoned, but the integration of 
First and Third Pillars is still aimed at by other means. See Presidency Conclusions, Council 
Document 11177/07.  
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Even if the judgment of the Court of Justice in Pupino is accepted without 
criticism, the last word has not yet been said about the connection between 
the legal instrument of the directive and that of the framework decision and, 
in a broader sense, the position of criminal law within European law. The 
sovereignty of the Member States on this issue must be viewed in the light of 
other observations as well, including the monitoring mechanisms in relation 
to the transposition and enforcement of directives and framework decisions.
In the First Pillar, the Commission monitors the application of the provi-
sions of the EC Treaty and the provisions laid down pursuant to this Treaty. 
This general task includes monitoring the implementation of directives. If the 
Commission discovers that a Member State has not adequately implemented 
a directive, and this Member State fails to follow the Commission’s advice in 
that regard, the Commission can bring a so-called infringement action on the 
basis of Article 226 EC. Other Member States also have that right (Art. 227 
EC), although practice shows that an infringement action is almost always 
initiated by the Commission. If the Court of Justice finds that a Member 
State has failed to fulfil obligations resting upon it, and that State subse-
quently does not comply adequately with the judgment, the Court of Justice 
may impose the payment of a lump sum or incremental penalty on the basis 
of Article 228 EC.
The TEU does not provide for a similar monitoring mechanism. There 
is no specific task set for the Commission at the level of monitoring the 
implementation of  framework decisions. In more general wording, Article 
36(2) TEU “only” expresses that the Commission shall be fully involved in 
the work in the area of police and judicial cooperation. The Commission 
does not have the right to initiate an infringement action. Monitoring is ac-
tually assigned primarily to the Member States together. This follows from 
Article 35(7) TEU, which relates to “… any dispute between Member States 
regarding the interpretation or the application of acts adopted under Article 
34(2) ….” It is self-evident that a dispute over the way in which a framework 
decision is applied by the Member States affects the implementation of that 
framework decision. Insofar as the dispute cannot be settled amicably by the 
Council, the Court of Justice is authorized to pass judgment. How the judg-
ment of the Court of Justice is supposed to be dealt with subsequently is not 
worked out in the TEU.
The difference in design of the monitoring mechanisms in the EC and the 
TEU can be viewed in the light of the legal order enshrined in the two trea-
ties: the Community legal order or intergovernmental cooperation (with some 
Community elements). It is clear that differences of opinion on implementa-
tion in the First Pillar can be brought before the Court of Justice much more 
easily – especially because the Commission operates independently from the 
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Member States – than in the Third Pillar. This can be considered as confir-
mation that the sovereignty of the Member States carries more weight in the 
Third Pillar than in the First Pillar.
The vitality of the view that the framework decision is a legal instrument 
having a less drastic effect on the national legal order than the directive 
seems to be expressed in a certain sense in the debate within the Council on 
the (possible) consequences of the judgment of the Court of Justice on the 
Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal 
law.23 In this judgment – against the will of a large number of Member States 
– the authority of the EC in the area of criminal law was accepted.24 This 
judgment was received enthusiastically by the Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament.25 The responses from the Member States to this judgment 
in the Council nevertheless make it clear that Community action in the area 
of criminal law must be carried out with restraint.26 According to the Member 
States, although acceptance of the authority of the EC in the area of criminal 
law entails that the sovereignty of Member States in relation to criminal law 
has lost some of its importance, this does not stand in the way of such re-
straint. That is why, if it is up to the Member States, the application of crimi-
nal law in the Community legal order will be relatively exceptional.
3.4. Meaning of similarities and differences
What implications do the similarities and differences between directives and 
framework decisions outlined above have for the question whether or not the 
implementation of these legal instruments is – more or less – governed by the 
same principles? It seems that the answer to this question is dictated mainly 
by what one wishes to place in the foreground. The similarities can be used to 
argue that implementation must be governed by the same norms, so that it is 
logical to consider the criteria developed for directives applicable by analogy 
to framework decisions. The Pupino case can then be explained in such a way 
that a restrictive interpretation must be given to the exclusion of direct effect 
in Article 34(2)(b) TEU: it is “only” about excluding case law on the direct 
23. Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 Jan. 2003 on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, O.J. 2003, L 29/55.
24. Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR 2005, I-7879.
25. Communication from the Commission on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 
13 September 2005 (Case C-176/03 Commission v. Council), COM(2005)583 final; European 
Parliament resolution on the consequences of the judgment of the Court of 13 September 2005 
(C-176/03 Commission v Council), Document A6–0172/2006.
26. Cf. Council Document 6466/06. 
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effect of directives, and nothing but that.27 In this context, however, it should 
be noted that the drafting history of that article does not show that in formu-
lating Article 34(2)(b) the Member States actually intended to incorporate the 
norms relating to the implementation of directives.
If one looks at the differences between Article 34(2)(b) TEU and Article 
249(3) EC in relation to the norms for the implementation of framework 
decisions and directives, the question at least arises whether, because of the 
stronger position of the Member States within the Third Pillar, the Member 
States may or must be allowed more freedom of implementation in compari-
son with the First Pillar. This question can be answered in two ways. On the 
one hand, one could say that the stronger position of the Member States is 
expressed mainly in the requirement that framework decisions may only be 
adopted unanimously, and that the effect of those framework decisions must 
be achieved first and foremost through the actions of national legislatures. 
Once a framework decision has been adopted, one could say that there would 
be no objection to stringent implementation norms. It is nevertheless strik-
ing that not the Commission but the Member States play the leading role in 
monitoring compliance with the norms. In view of this, it can also be argued 
that as the Third Pillar relates to criminal law and cooperation in criminal 
matters, and the Member States want to maintain sovereignty (as far as pos-
sible) precisely in the area of criminal law, the Member States must therefore 
be given sufficient room in implementing framework decisions – and are 
actually given such room, in view of the absence of an infringement action 
according to the EC model – to achieve the result intended by the framework 
decision as they see fit in their own criminal law. In this view, a link should 
not automatically be sought with the strict norms developed for the imple-
mentation of directives.
All in all, a comparison of the definitions of the framework decision and 
the directive in the TEU and EC, respectively, does not result in an unequivo-
cal conclusion regarding the question which norms apply to the implemen-
tation of framework decisions. It is therefore meaningful to take a look at 
evaluation practice to see whether consensus has been reached on such norms 
in that practice.
27. Cf. Peers, op. cit. supra note 18, at 915.
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4. Assessment of the transposition of framework decisions by the
 Commission and Council
4.1. Background of the evaluation procedure
In the last few years, a practice has developed in which reports are made on 
the way in which Member States implement framework decisions in their 
national legal order.28 The basis for this practice is not the TEU, but the pro-
visions included in the individual framework decisions. According to these 
provisions, the Member States must notify the Council and the Commission 
after the end of the implementation period of the texts of the provisions by 
which the relevant framework decision has been transposed.29 The Council’s 
task is to check the extent to which the Member States have taken the mea-
sures necessary to comply with the framework decision. That assessment 
must be made on the basis of, for example, a written report by the Commis-
sion. This report is evidence of the substantial role the Commission plays 
in the evaluation procedure. The Commission itself places this role in the 
context of Article 36 TEU, on the basis of which the Commission is fully in-
volved in the activities relating to judicial and police cooperation.30 In some 
framework decisions, besides the general point of interest in a timely and 
correct transposition, specific instructions are given in relation to evaluation. 
These concern the indication of special points for attention in the evaluation,31 
or the instruction (to the Commission) to make legislative proposals where 
necessary.32 
It follows from the provisions of the framework decisions on evaluation 
that the objective of the procedure for that purpose is to check the extent to 
which the Member States have transposed the content of the framework deci-
sion promptly and correctly into national law. In that context, the Member 
States must submit the texts of the provisions transposing the relevant frame-
28. A list of these reports, with sources, is included in the annex. Below (in the footnotes) 
reference is made only to the source of these reports. The annex also contains the full title as 
well as the sources of the framework decisions to which these reports relate. These framework 
decisions are cited briefly below.
29. See e.g. Art. 11(2) Framework Decision 2003/383/JHA; Art. 18 Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA. 
30. E.g. COM(2004)346 final, p. 6.
31. See e.g. Art. 11 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA; Art. 9(2) Council Framework 
Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 Oct. 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, O.J. 2004, L 335/8; 
Art. 20(7) Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 Feb. 2005 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, O.J. 2005, L 76/16.
32. Art. 34 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.
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work decision. This implies that the evaluation concerns strict implementa-
tion – transposition into the provisions of laws and regulations – rather than 
(also) the functioning of the framework decision in legal practice. The provi-
sion of information by the Member States enables the Council to assess the 
transposition. Partly because of this, the Member States can call one anoth-
er to account for the interpretation and application of framework decisions, 
and differences of opinion can be discussed in the Council and possibly be 
brought before the Court of Justice on the basis of Article 35(7) TEU. The 
Commission does not play a part in this procedure, as noted in section 3.3, 
above.33 For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that the Eu-
ropean Parliament has no – formal – task in the evaluation procedure. Nev-
ertheless, the European Parliament has its own possibilities to make known 
its position on the way in which the implementation of a framework decision 
is taking place. For instance, based on the evaluation of the Framework De-
cision on the European Arrest Warrant, the European Parliament adopted a 
recommendation on its own initiative.34
4.2. Procedural course of affairs
The Commission takes the lead in the evaluation procedure. The conclusion 
can be drawn from its reports that it makes great efforts to have the necessary 
information from the Member States at its disposal. Such information is of-
ten delivered late – after the period set in the relevant framework decision has 
expired – and sometimes not at all. The Commission also criticizes the inade-
quate quality and punctuality of the information delivered.35 In consequence, 
as the Commission states, the evaluation must be carried out on the basis of 
a superficial and incomplete picture of the transposition provisions of the 
various Member States.36 The Commission tries to avoid this consequence to 
the extent that it also searches independently for additional information, for 
example by incorporating the answers on questionnaires distributed (in a dif-
ferent context) among the Member States.
33. However, the Commission Report can help to establish a solid factual basis for this 
procedure. Cf. COM(2006)770 final, p. 4.
34. European Parliament recommendation to the Council with a proposal for a European 
Parliament recommendation to the Council on evaluation of the European arrest warrant, P6_
TA(2006)0083.
35. COM(2001)771 final, pp. 10, 17; COM(2003)532 final, p. 6; COM(2004)54 final, p. 2; 
COM(2004)230 final, pp. 3, 22, 23; COM(2004)346 final, pp. 3, 19; COM(2004)409 final, p. 3; 
COM(2005)63 final, p. 2; COM(2005)858 final, p. 4; COM(2006)8 final, p. 2; COM(2006)65 
final, p. 7; COM(2006)72, pp. 2, 6; COM(2006)187 final, p. 3; COM(2006)770 final, pp. 3, 6, 
8.
36. See e.g. COM(2001)771 final, p. 4.
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After the Commission has drafted an evaluation report, an assessment by 
the Council follows of the extent to which the Member States have taken the 
necessary measures to comply with the framework decision. The relevant 
Council documents have essentially the same structure: the findings of the 
Commission are summarized and the Member States requested to provide ad-
ditional information where necessary. To date, the decision has been taken as 
a standard to have the Commission make a supplementary report on the basis 
of the (additional) information.37 The Commission’s objection that the provi-
sion of information by the Member States is inadequate is recognized to the 
extent that the importance of good provision of information is emphasized in 
some Council documents, especially concerning the implementation of gen-
eral provisions or use of general definitions, terms and concepts in national 
legislation.38 The Commission has meanwhile published a second, supple-
mentary report in relation to several framework decisions.
All in all, the Council documents relating to the assessment of the imple-
mentation of framework decisions by the Council are not very informative, 
partly because hardly any substantive debates seem to be held within the 
Council on those documents.39 One Council document is an exception. This 
concerns the document in which the (individual) responses of the Member 
States are given to the report by the Commission on the implementation of 
the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. Regarding the pro-
cedural course of affairs, two interesting points of view can be derived from 
these responses. For instance, first of all, a number of Member States ex-
pressed the wish for an opportunity to respond to the draft findings of the 
Commission before the report is published.40 The possibility now exists only 
after the Commission has adopted its (initial) report. It is apparently experi-
enced as annoying that omissions in reports by the Commission cannot be 
pointed out and remedied prior to publication, perhaps because those reports 
contain positive and especially negative evaluations of the transposition by 
the different Member States and therefore have a certain pillory effect. In 
addition, the objection is expressed that the Commission consults sources 
independently to obtain information on the way in which the Member States 
have transposed framework decisions, without it being clear to the Member 
37. Council Document 14603/3/01 REV 3, p. 5; Council Document 10371/2/04 REV 2, pp. 
6–7; Council Document 14830/2/04 REV 2, pp. 11–12; Council Document 10369/2/04 REV 2, 
p. 8; Council Document 11685/2/04 REV 2, p. 9; Council Document 11678/2/04 REV 2, p. 11.
38. Council Document 14830/2/04 REV 2, p. 6; Council Document 11685/2/04 REV 2, p. 5; 
Council Document 11687/2/04 REV 2, p. 6.
39. Cf. Report on the implementation of the Hague programme for 2005, COM(2006) 333 
final, p. 11.
40. Council Document 11528/05, pp. 35, 38, 83, 95, 99.
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States when they make this information available that the information is used 
(partly) with a view to evaluation.41 This indicates a wish on the part of the 
Member States to monitor the evaluation process.
4.3. Substantive assessment
In the first report published by the Commission – the report on the imple-
mentation of the Framework Decision on protecting the euro against counter-
feiting – the Commission reported extensively on the assessment framework 
which is supposed to apply to evaluation.42 Since then, that framework has 
been applied in a standard fashion by the Commission in evaluation reports.43 
In essence, the Commission equates the legal instrument of the framework 
decision with that of the directive. In doing so, the Commission points 
out that both legal instruments are binding with respect to the result to be 
achieved, but allow the Member States the right to choose the form and meth-
ods. The Commission acknowledges that framework decisions do not have di-
rect effect, but does not attach any special consequences to that observation. 
In consequence, the evaluation criteria for framework decisions are equated 
with those for directives. More specifically, the Commission lists the follow-
ing criteria:
1. form and methods of implementation of the result to be achieved must be 
chosen in a manner which ensures that the directive/framework decision 
functions effectively with account being taken of its aims;
2. each Member State is obliged to implement directives/framework deci-
sions in a manner which satisfies the requirements of clarity and legal 
certainty and thus to transpose the provisions of the directive/framework 
decision into national provisions having binding force;
3. transposition need not necessarily require enactment in precisely the same 
words in an express legal provision; thus a general legal context (such as 
appropriate already existing measures) may be sufficient, as long as the 
full application of the directive/framework decision is assured in a suf-
ficiently clear and precise manner;
4. directives/framework decisions must be implemented within the period 
prescribed therein.44
41. Council Document 11528/05, p. 68.
42. COM(2001)771 final, pp. 4–7.
43. COM(2004)54 final, pp. 3–4; COM(2004)230 final, pp. 4–6; COM(2004)346 final, 
pp. 3–6; COM(2004)409 final, pp. 4–5; SEC(2005)267, pp. 3–4; SEC(2004)1725, pp. 
5–6; SEC(2006)79, pp. 3–4; COM(2006)187 final, pp. 4–5; COM(2006)770 final, p. 4–5; 
SEC(2007)979, p. 3.
44. COM(2001)771 final, p. 5.
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Not only from this list, but also from the way in which the Commission 
applies these criteria in the various reports, it is evident that the Commission 
seeks a very close connection with the case law of the Court of Justice on 
the implementation of directives. For instance, whether the Member States 
have chosen generally binding provisions in transposing framework deci-
sions is strictly monitored. In addition, although no verbatim transposition of 
provisions from framework decisions is required, there is strict monitoring of 
whether those positions are expressed clearly and precisely in national law. 
In this way, the Commission reveals a preference for the most literal possible 
transposition. This will be explained on the basis of some examples.
The Commission rejects the implementation of framework decisions by 
way of non-binding rules, such as administrative practices, circulars and 
policy rules. The evaluation reports show several examples, of which the 
report on the Framework Decision on victim care is the most striking. This 
framework decision contains several provisions which the Member States 
predominantly put into effect by means of practical measures. These include 
the obligations for Member States to guarantee the safety, privacy and in a 
certain sense, also the welfare of victims (and their family members), which 
obligations are formulated in part as specific measures, such as the avoidance 
of unnecessary contact between victims and offenders in court buildings, to 
be achieved if necessary by providing separate waiting areas for victims.45 
The Commission observes that only Germany has transposed this require-
ment correctly. Other Member States did not notify any transposition provi-
sions or stated that the provisions were incorporated only in practice. The 
Commission holds: “The problem is that no national legislation clearly pro-
vides for a victim’s right to avoid contact with the offender.”46 The Commis-
sion also points out that, as far as the obligation is concerned for the Member 
States to cooperate in – concisely stated – fostering, developing and improv-
ing the protection of victims’ interests,47 “no country forwarded legislation.”48 
The Commission makes similar remarks regarding the obligation under the 
Framework Decision on money laundering to treat the measures requested 
in mutual assistance requests with the same priority as similar measures in 
domestic proceedings.49 The Commission notes that the Member States have 
not notified any specific transposition provisions.50 
45. Art. 8 Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.
46. COM(2004)54 final, p. 14.
47. Art. 12 Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.
48. COM(2004)54 final, p. 16.
49. Art. 4 Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA.
50. COM(2004)230 final, p. 20. See also COM(2006)72 final, p. 5.
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The next example relates to the Framework Decision on joint investigation 
teams. Article 1(3) of this Framework Decision provides that the Member 
State in which the investigation team operates must, among other things, 
make the necessary organizational arrangements for it to do so. The Neth-
erlands has transposed and worked out this framework decision in an in-
struction of the Public Prosecution Service and not in the rules of Articles 
552qa-552qe of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Commission therefore 
concluded that the obligation to make organizational arrangements in the leg-
islation adopted by the Netherlands had not been dealt with.51 More examples 
of this kind can be found in the reports, in which the Commission states in 
unmistakable terms that provisions from framework decisions must be trans-
posed into generally binding provisions.52
In the evaluation reports, the Commission applies the criterion that the 
formulation of transposition provisions must be specific, precise, and clear, 
without verbatim transposition of framework decisions being required.53 The 
Commission demonstrates that its assessments are stringent. There must be 
no doubt that the Member States comply with the obligations ensuing from 
a framework decision. The following example can be given as an illustration. 
On the basis of Article 3 of the Framework Decision on money laundering, 
the Member States may exclude the confiscation of property the value of 
which would be less than ¤4000. In Finnish legislation, this is expressed in 
the provision that confiscation need not be carried out if the proceeds or the 
value of the objects is “negligible”. In the Commission’s opinion, this is not 
evidence of a correct transposition of the provision of Article 3 of the Frame-
work Decision on money laundering.54 More generally speaking, it is striking 
that in its reports – including the accompanying staff working documents 
–  the Commission goes through the provisions of a framework decision one 
by one, and checks the extent to which the Member States have transposed 
the relevant provision correctly. This may perhaps strengthen the tendency to 
test the transposition provisions rather literally against the framework deci-
sion. Only recently have the Commission’s reports stated explicitly that the 
connection between the transposition provisions must (also) be examined.55 It 
appears from this that the accent has come to lie more on the question wheth-
51. COM(2005)858 final, p. 6.
52. See e.g. COM(2004)54 final, pp. 7, 10, 12, 20; SEC(2005)267, p. 4; SEC(2006)79, p. 
4.
53. See e.g. SEC(2004) 1725, p. 29.
54. COM(2004)230 final, p. 16. See for other examples COM(2001)771 final, pp. 12–13; 
COM(2004)346 final, p. 13; COM(2006)65 final, p. 3; SEC(2004)688, p. 26.
55. SEC(2004)1725, p. 6; COM(2006)187 final, p. 5.
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er the transposition provisions as a whole comply with the obligations under 
the relevant framework decision. 
The foregoing shows that the Commission’s evaluation reports on the 
implementation of framework decisions are actually limited to a – strict – 
monitoring of the transposition of provisions from framework decisions into 
national legislation. In this context, the “result” to be achieved, as stated in 
Article (34)(2)(b) TEU, is determined first and foremost on the basis of the 
type of “methods” used by the Member States. Implementation in a broader 
sense (compliance) is not dealt with, for example by explicitly and thorough-
ly examining implementation practice in the Member States. This approach 
is, at any rate, in line with the fact that the framework decisions “only” re-
quire the Member States to submit the texts of the provisions by which the 
framework decisions are implemented. Reference could also be made to the 
text of Article 34(2)(b) TEU, from which it is evident that the aim of frame-
work decisions is to approximate the “laws and regulations” of the Member 
States (see section 3.2 above). The Commission does not mention the latter 
argument.
At the same time, the examples given above were not chosen by chance. 
These examples show that the evaluation method used by the Commission 
mainly reviews the Member States’ compliance on paper, and not the actual 
and practical achievement of the result intended by the framework decision. 
Without underestimating the importance that can generally be attached to 
written rules unequivocally laying down rights and obligations, one should 
not lose sight of the fact that it does not always make sense to codify every 
obligation ensuing from a framework decision;56 on the other hand, there is 
little value in adopting statutory provisions without adequate implementation 
and enforcement practice.
In Council documents on the evaluation of the implementation of frame-
work decisions, hardly anything is said about the Commission’s evaluation 
method. This is remarkable, because there are indications that the Member 
States need a more flexible and less stringent evaluation framework. A simple 
but telling example can be derived from the responses of the Member States 
to the (first) report by the Commission on the transposition of the Frame-
work Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. This Framework Decision 
abolishes the formal extradition procedure within the European Union and 
replaces it by a, more or less, informal, simple and swift procedure, based 
on the principle of mutual recognition. When a European arrest warrant is is-
56. See also Art. 4, 5, 10, 13, 14 and 15 Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA; Art. 11 and 12 
Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA; Art. 10 (2) Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA; Art. 7 (3) 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.
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sued, the Member State on whose territory the person concerned is located, is 
in principle obliged to arrest and surrender this person to the issuing Member 
State. Article 30 of the Framework Decision prescribes that the costs made in 
executing a European arrest warrant on the territory of the executing Member 
State are to be paid by this Member State. The other costs are payable by the 
issuing Member State. Several of the eleven Member States criticized by the 
Commission for not (adequately) codifying this provision57 responded rather 
sharply to this.58 The tenor of these responses is that it does not make sense 
to lay down such a provision by law, because this provision must actually be 
complied with in an interstate context. It can be concluded as well that, in the 
opinion of the Member States, the Commission often makes errors in inter-
preting national provisions, and also that the Commission’s assessment is not 
always considered as balanced.59
4.4. Interpretation of framework decisions in evaluation reports
A potential function of the evaluation reports has not yet been dealt with 
above. The reports can function partly as a “discussion forum” for the inter-
pretation of framework decisions. The evaluation procedure was not estab-
lished with the (explicit) intention of creating such a forum, but anyone who 
studies the evaluation reports comes across interesting and sometimes singu-
lar interpretations by the Commission of provisions from framework deci-
sions. These interpretations could often serve very well as starting points for 
debate over the meaning of provisions from framework decisions. Partly with 
a view to the Court of Justice’s answers to preliminary questions, such a de-
bate would contribute to the development of law in the EU. At the same time, 
it should be noted that this debate function is hardly used at all in Council 
documents.60
To illustrate this, we mention several interpretation issues that come to the 
fore in the Commission’s evaluation reports. Regarding the Framework Deci-
sion on combating terrorism, the question arises whether the penalization of 
“participating in the activities of a terrorist group” (Art. 2(b)) requires the 
57. SEC(2005)267, p. 31; SEC(2006)79, p. 33. See also SEC(2007)979, p. 36.
58. Council Document 11528/05, pp. 66, 89, 101, 113.
59. Cf. the remark of the Dutch government in Council Document 11528/05, p. 67: “The 
evaluation in the staff working document lacks consistency. Conclusions at both the beginning and 
end of that document highlight the fact that national legislation conflicts with the FD [framework 
decisions; MJB] on a number of points. The central section does mention discrepancies but gives 
no evaluation of them. Nor does the document reflect a balanced assessment of the various 
Member States.”
60. An exception is Council Document 11528/05.
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penalization of participation as such, or whether it is sufficient to penalize 
terrorist acts in relation to a terrorist group. In the staff working document 
accompanying the Commission’s evaluation report, the consequences of both 
interpretations are thoroughly discussed.61 One of the optional grounds for 
refusal contained in the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 
is that the judicial authorities of the executing Member State have decided ei-
ther not to prosecute or to halt proceedings. The Commission points out that 
this ground for refusal must be applied as mandatory if prosecution has been 
halted because the suspect has fulfilled certain conditions, given the judg-
ment of the Court of Justice in the Gözütok and Brugge cases.62
Another example concerns the interpretation of Article 3 of the Framework 
Decision on combating trafficking in human beings, regarding the applica-
tion of a maximum penalty that is not less than eight years. The Commis-
sion poses the question of how the aggravating circumstances referred to 
in this provision should be interpreted in relation to the different forms of 
trafficking in minor children in the light of the International Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. The Commission argues in this context that consider-
ation of the victim as particularly vulnerable should not be limited to victims 
of sexual exploitation, even though only that form of trafficking in human 
beings is explicitly mentioned in Article 3(2)(b) of the Framework Decision 
on combating trafficking in human beings.63 
5. Findings
5.1. European norms for the implementation of framework decisions?
The views of the institutions emerging explicitly or implicitly from the evalu-
ation procedures on the norms for the implementation of framework decisions 
can be linked fairly easily to the results of the comparison made in section 3 
between Article 34(2)(b) TEU and Article 249(3) EC. The Commission pro-
ceeds on the basis of the similarity between these provisions, including the 
criteria developed by the Court of Justice for the implementation of direc-
tives, and in this way gives shape to the norms for implementing framework 
decisions. The Commission’s approach basically amounts to the requirements 
that framework decisions must in principle be transposed as precisely as pos-
61. SEC(2004)688, pp. 14–15.
62. SEC(2005)267, p. 10, with reference to Cases C-187 & 385/01, Gözütok and Brugge, 
[2003] ECR I-1345.
63. COM(2006)187 final, p. 7.
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sible into binding legislation. This approach can be supported by the fact that 
the framework decisions only require the Member States to submit the texts 
of the provisions by which the framework decision in question is transposed, 
and by the reference to laws and regulations in Article 34(2)(b) TEU. On the 
other hand, the Council claims – usually by way of individual Member States 
– a much broader margin in transposing framework decisions, amounting to 
the requirement that the intended result must be achieved without stringent 
requirements being set on the type of methods used to do so. For example, 
non-binding rules and existing practices should count as adequate methods 
for achieving the result. The Council apparently assumes that Article 34(2)(b) 
TEU, partly in view of the prominent role of the Member States’ sovereignty 
in the area of criminal law, leaves sufficient room on this point and that, at 
any rate, the reference to “laws and regulations” in that provision does not 
imply that that this must be in line with the stringent implementation norms 
for directives. Yet other arguments may play a part in the background. One 
could argue that the material governed by the framework decisions is less 
technically legal in nature, or is at least experienced as such, compared to 
the average directive. It is also important that framework decisions prescribe 
obligations of which it does not make sense to transpose them into binding 
regulations, because primarily practical measures have to be taken. Nor can 
it be ruled out that the Member States’ dissatisfaction is partly aroused by the 
idea that the implementation criteria in the First Pillar have become too rigid 
in the course of the years.
Taking a look at the whole, it becomes clear that there is a lack of consen-
sus regarding the (contents of) the prevailing principles for the implementa-
tion of framework decisions. It is true that the Commission’s approach is 
based on valid arguments. At the same time, another approach to the evalu-
ation procedure – more flexible and less stringent – can be advocated. The 
most important argument for a different approach is that the focus will shift 
from the use of certain methods to the achievement of the result, thus from a 
more procedural to a more substantive point of view. Such a change of focus 
would probably contribute to the achievement of the objectives of European 
framework decisions. While at the moment opinions differ on the need of a 
change in approach, the developments in the European Union could be seen 
as a guidance for the design of evaluation procedures in the near future.
 
5.2. Where do we go from here?
In view of the modest role the Court of Justice plays in the Third Pillar, par-
ticularly because of the lack of a fully-fledged infringement action, the debate 
over the norms for the implementation of framework decisions cannot be ex-
1382  Borgers CML Rev. 2007
pected to be decided soon. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, 
owing to the judgment of the Court of Justice on the Framework Decision on 
environmental criminal law,64 criminal law is no longer exclusively a matter 
for the Third Pillar. Although the Member States have not shown any enthu-
siasm for the time being for the positioning of criminal law in the First Pillar, 
it is nevertheless a fact that, should criminal law issues increasingly become 
the subject of directives, the evaluation of those directives will be based on 
the criteria developed by the Court of Justice. This could be an argument for 
applying these criteria to framework decisions as well.
The future of the Third Pillar cannot be ignored either. It is clear that the 
Constitution for Europe is no longer likely to become effective as such, but 
that does not forestall the integration of the First and Third Pillar accord-
ing to the Community model in the near future.65 This would in fact mean 
(among other things) that the legal instrument of the framework decision 
would give way to the directive. With that, the evaluation and monitoring 
mechanism from the EC would relate to legal instruments in the field of ju-
dicial and police cooperation. The likely effect of this would be a shift in ac-
cent from evaluations to infringement actions, in which the strict criteria for 
the transposition of directives are applied. That scenario could come about 
mainly if the Member States do not choose at any time to develop the process 
of evaluation and assessment further and in that context give further shape to 
the norms for the implementation of framework decisions.
5.3. Another manner of evaluation and assessment?
If the choice is made to adjust and improve the procedure for evaluation and 
assessment of the implementation of framework decisions – or in more gen-
eral terms: EU criminal law instruments –, the starting point could be that the 
nature of the provision in a framework decision would determine the manner 
in which evaluation takes place. A provision for the purpose of (minimum) 
harmonization of penal sanctions should be transposed into statutory provi-
sions as a matter of course. In that context, the current approach in which 
special attention is devoted – on paper – to the transposition of provisions 
from framework decisions into statutory provisions can be used, although 
several practical improvements are possible. In that context, these could in-
64. Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR 2005, I-7879.
65. Besides the Presidency conclusions referred to in note 22 supra,  one may also refer 
to the recent debate on the “bridge” provision of Art. 42 TEU. See COM(2006)211 final, p. 
6. Cf. also Jour-Schröder and Konow, “Die Passerelle des Art. 42 EU-Vertrag – Macht sie die 
Regeln des Verfassungsentwurfs für einen europäischen Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und 
des Rechts obsolet?”, (2006) EuZW, 550–555.
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clude a more streamlined provision of information from the Member States 
to the Commission,66 and giving them the opportunity to correct mistakes 
in draft reports by the Commission. The latter is especially important for 
facilitating a constructive tone of the evaluation procedure, so that the forum 
function of this procedure discussed in section 4.4 above better comes into its 
own. 
On other parts, concerning the structure of implementation practice or 
more “intangible” provisions, such as those relating to sanctions, a manner 
of evaluation should be chosen in which implementation in a broad sense is 
examined – with attention for the practical functioning of the implementa-
tion legislation and the fulfilment of tasks by the responsible authorities. The 
evaluation method most indicated at present is perhaps mutual evaluation 
by Member States. Quite some experience has already been gained with this 
in the EU.67 The central point in this regard is that a committee of experts 
consults as many relevant sources of information as possible and also visits 
the different Member States to exchange ideas on the spot with (among oth-
ers) the responsible officials. Such mutual evaluation was recently set up 
in relation to the practical application of the European Arrest Warrant.68 To 
this extent, the improvement advocated here has already become reality. It is 
advisable to make mutual evaluation, where meaningful, a systematic part of 
the standard evaluation procedure.69 
The adjustments and improvements advocated here in the procedure for 
evaluating and assessing the implementation of framework decisions is in 
line to a certain extent with recent proposals by the Commission in relation to 
the evaluation of EU policy on freedom, security and justice.70 In these pro-
posals, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, monitoring the imple-
mentation of European measures, including the transposition of framework 
decisions into national legislation and, on the other, evaluation of the actual 
results of those measures.71 The Commission presents an evaluation mecha-
nism that goes beyond an assessment of the transposition of legal instruments 
into national legislation, and which focuses on mapping out the implementa-
66. Cf. COM(2001)771 final, p. 18; COM(2004)346 final, p. 19.
67. Cf. e.g. Joint Action of 5 Dec. 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 
of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a mechanism for evaluating the application and 
implementation at national level of international undertakings in the fight against organized 
crime, O.J. 1997, L 344/7.
68. See e.g. Council Document 6206/06.
69. Cf. COM(2007)407 final, p. 10.  
70. Evaluation of EU Policies on Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2006)332 final 
71. COM(2006)332 final, pp. 4–5, 99–100.
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tion and effects of EU policy in the practice of the Member States.72 With 
that, the Commission acknowledges that in current evaluation practice, such 
as that developed for framework decisions, the actual results that framework 
decisions bring about in the Member States are almost completely disregard-
ed.73 The evaluation mechanism proposed by the Commission seems able to 
give a better view of those results. At the same time, it should be noted that 
transposition into national legislation as a separate point for attention has not 
been abandoned and that the Commission will continue to report separately 
on this transposition. There is no evidence that the Commission will use dif-
ferent criteria in assessing this transposition. This means that mapping out the 
actual results – the effects of EU policy – will not take the place (wholly or 
in part) of the strict review of the transposition of provisions from framework 
decisions, but that both approaches will be used alongside each other.
The Member States could also exert more influence on the manner in 
which evaluation is carried out. Framework decisions could, for example, 
indicate the way in which provisions are to be transposed and the procedure 
applied in evaluating the implementation of the relevant framework deci-
sion. In this way, the Member States would already give themselves a certain 
implementation margin and avoid being “surprised” in a certain sense by the 
way in which the Commission gives shape to evaluation. Besides this, the 
Member States should guard against the use of vague terms in framework 
decisions, because these could result in much debate at the evaluation stage 
concerning the way in which the relevant provisions should be transposed.
A relevant question in this regard is still whether, in the event that the 
evaluation procedures are developed further, it would also be appropriate to 
increase the role of the Court of Justice. This could be achieved, for example 
by making an infringement action on the initiative of the Commission pos-
sible. The development and adoption of norms for the implementation of 
framework decisions would then largely be in the hands of the Court of Jus-
tice. Given the dissatisfaction that can be observed with respect to the Com-
mission’s current manner of evaluation, it is not likely that the Member States 
would be willing to grant this role to the Court of Justice any time soon. 
After all – partly in the light of the Pupino judgment74 – it must be taken into 
account that the Court of Justice considers the norms developed for direc-
tives applicable by analogy to framework decisions. Nevertheless, if (more) 
consensus is reached on the norms for the implementation of framework de-
cisions and those norms are codified in some form, it could be considered 
72. COM(2006)332 final, pp. 2–13.
73. COM(2006)332 final, pp. 93–94.
74. Pupino, supra note 12.
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appropriate to strengthen the role of the Court of Justice. Member States are 
ultimately required to achieve the result intended by a framework decision. 
The fact that a monitoring mechanism exists for this, ending in a court ac-
tion, is not problematic in itself.
6. In conclusion
This paper has shown that the question of which norms apply to the imple-
mentation of framework decisions at European level is difficult to answer un-
equivocally. There is a debate over the contents of the norms, as well as over 
the way in which the implementation is evaluated. In my opinion, it would 
be helpful to continue the debate over the question of which norms actually 
apply to the implementation of framework decisions – or in more general 
terms: EU criminal law instruments – and what the most appropriate manner 
of evaluation is. In that area, much is still to be gained.
Annex
Reports by the Commission on measures taken to comply with the 
framework decisions
a) Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on increas-
ing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counter-
feiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, O.J. 2000, L 140/1
 – Commission Report, 13 December 2001, COM(2001)771 final
 – Second Commission Report, 3 September 2003, COM(2003)532 final; 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2003)936
b) Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the 
standing of victims in criminal proceedings, O.J. 2001, L 82/1
 – Report of the Commission, 3 February 2004, COM(2004)54 final; 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2004)102
c) Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 2001 combat-
ing fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, O.J. 2001, L 
149/1
 – Commission Report, 30 April 2004, COM(2004)346 final; Commis-
sion Staff Working Paper, SEC(2004)532
 – Second Commission Report, 20 February 2006, COM(2006)65 final; 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2006)188
d) Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA of 26 June 2001 on money 
laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation 
1386  Borgers CML Rev. 2007
of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, O.J. 2001, L 182/1
 – Commission Report, 5 April 2004, COM(2004)230 final; Commission 
Staff Working Paper, SEC(2004)383
 – Second Commission Report, 21 February 2006, COM(2006)72 final; 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2006)219
e) Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002 on joint 
investigation teams, O.J. 2002, L 162/1
 – Commission Report, 7 January 2005, COM(2005)858 final; Commis-
sion Staff Working Paper, SEC(2004)1725
f) Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combat-
ing terrorism, O.J. 2002, L 164/3
 – Commission Report, 8 June 2004, COM(2004)409 final; Commission 
Staff Working Paper, SEC(2004)688
g) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the Eu-
ropean arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States, O.J. 2002, L 190/1
 – Commission Report, 23 February 2005, COM(2005)63 final;  Commis-
sion Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005)267
 – Revised Commission Report, 24 January 2006, COM(2006)8 final; 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2006)79
 – Second Commission Report, 11 July 2007, COM(2007)407 final; Com-
mission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2007)979
h) Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combat-
ing trafficking in human beings, O.J. 2002, L 203/1
 – Commission Report, 2 May 2006, COM(2006)187 final; Commission 
Staff Working Paper, SEC(2006)525
i) Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on 
the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence, O.J. 2002, L 328/1
 – Commission Report, 6 December 2006, COM(2006)770 final; Com-
mission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2006)1591
